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Abstract: Many countries levy reduced-rate indirect taxes on newspapers, with
proclaimed policy goals of stimulating investment in journalism and ensuring low
newspaper prices. However, by taking into account the fact that the media industry
operates in two-sided markets, we nd the paradoxical result that the consequences
of a low-tax regime might be quite the opposite; low investments and high prices.
We also show that the low-tax regime tends to increase newspaper di¤erentiation.
If the advertising market is relatively small, the newspapers might invest too little
in journalism and be too di¤erentiated from a social point of view. In this case a
tax increase will be welfare-enhancing.
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1 Introduction
Printed newspapers are in most countries either exempted from sales taxes and value-
added taxes (VAT), or taxed at a reduced rate (see Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006b).1
This policy is founded on the belief that media rms are important providers of
information, language and culture, and that media pluralism produces socially de-
sirable outcomes.2 The low-rate regimes in Europe and the US are in particular
perceived to increase media di¤erentiation and media pluralism, reduce newspaper
prices, and encourage to greater investments in journalism and other quality mea-
sures (see European Commission, 2004).
The exemption from value added taxation has come under debate in several Eu-
ropean countries. In Denmark, for example, the Ministry of Culture has published a
report which discusses the consequences of increasing the VAT rate on newspapers
(Rambøll Management Consulting, 2009).3 The Report points out two main con-
sequences of abolishing the VAT exemption for newspapers. First, it will improve
the competitiveness of e.g. electronic newspapers, because the price of paper-based
newspapers will increase. Second, and as a direct consequence of the price increase,
the consumers who buy paper-based newspapers will be harmed. The Danish report
neglects the fact that newspapers serve both advertisers and readers, and thus that
they operate in two-sided markets.4 This neglect means, for example, that the Re-
ports estimation of demand elasticities on the reader side of the market says very
little about the consequences of higher newspaper taxes. The interdependence be-
tween the reader and the advertising market seems to be missing in public debates
1In Germany, for example, newspapers are subject to a rate of 7% in contrast to the regular rate
of 19%, whilst countries like the UK, Denmark, Finland and Norway exempt newspapers from VAT
altogether. Newspapers are also either fully or partially exempted from sales taxes in a number of
U.S. states.
2Examples of papers that link media rms to the political process and democracy are Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2004) and Strømberg (2004).
3Another example is Norway where a government appointed commission is to investigate
whether a zero rated value added tax is still desirable
4See Evans (2003a,b) or Rochet and Tirole (2003) for examples and classications of two-sided
platform rms.
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also in other countries that consider the possibility of increasing the VAT rate on
newspapers.
In this paper we explicitly take into account the two-sidedness of the newspaper
business, and show that low VAT rates on newspapers may actually cause newspaper
prices to be higher and investments in journalism lower than what would otherwise
be the case. This indicates that the tax exemption of the newspaper industry is
counter-productive relative to the stated policy goals. However, we show that the
low-rate regime tends to increase newspaper di¤erentiation, which seems to be in
accordance with political preferences.
In order to bring forward these results we use a Hotelling-type framework with
two competing newspapers and a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed
along the unit line. The two-sidedness of the market is taken care of by assuming
that the newspapers derive income from two groups of customers, advertisers and
readers, and that the advertisers nd it more attractive to place ads in a given
newspaper the larger its circulation.5 The newspapers choice of location on the
Hotelling line can be interpreted as describing their proles. We consider a three-
stage game. At stage 1 each newspaper decides on its prole and how much to invest
in journalism. At stage 2 the ad level is determined, and at stage 3 the newspapers
compete in prices.
A reduction in value-added taxes for newspapers implies that the protability of
selling newspapers increases relative to the protability of selling advertisements. As
a consequence, it becomes less imperative for the newspapers to attract a large audi-
ence in order to sell advertising space. Instead, each newspaper wants to increase its
earnings from the reader side of the market. It can do so by choosing a prole that
di¤erentiates it further from its competitor; thereby each newspaper gains market
power that allows it to charge a higher price to readers. The greater market power
in turn makes it less important for each newspaper to invest in journalism. In this
sense a reduced VAT rate harms consumers; newspaper prices increase and the qual-
ity levels fall. However, the newspapers might overinvest in journalism from a social
5The share of advertising in total revenue in the press industry di¤ers across countries, but is
typically around 50 percent. See Albarran and Chan-Olmsted (1998).
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point of view. Indeed, we show that rst-best policy might call for taxation of both
newspaper sales and advertising revenue to ensure optimal investments and di¤eren-
tiation. It should be noted, though, that we abstract from the question of whether
the market economy is likely to generate too much or too little advertising from a
social point of view. According to the informative (and partly the complementary)
view of advertising we might expect too few ads in market equilibrium, while the
persuasive view typically has the opposite prediction.6 Clearly, the optimal tax rate
on ads might be lower than the one derived in this paper if advertising mainly is
informative (and higher if advertising to a large extent is persuasive).
Our paper relates to two strands of literature. Most closely related to our paper
is a growing literature on the price-setting behavior of rms in two-sided markets.7
This literature typically abstracts from taxation issues. The literature on commodity
taxation, on the other hand, does not consider two-sided markets.8 One exception
is Kind, Koethenbuerger and Schjelderup (2008), who compare the e¤ects of ad-
valorem and specic taxes on a good sold by a monopoly in a two-sided market.
They nd, contrary to popular belief, that a lower ad-valorem tax may increase
the price and reduce sales, while a per-unit subsidy (or a lower specic tax) has
the opposite e¤ect. They do not consider how taxes inuence di¤erentiation and
investment incentives. More closely related to our analysis is Gabszewicz et al
(2001, 2002), who use the Hotelling model to analyze how the size of the advertising
market a¤ects the political proles of newspapers. They nd that the larger the
advertisement market, the more important it is for the newspapers to moderate
their political prole. Thereby the newspapers are better able to serve the mass
market and raise income from the advertising market.
More indirectly related to our paper is the literature on media diversity on truth-
telling. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) use a "persuasion game" and nd that as long
as there is at least one information provider in every state of nature that wants the
6See Bagwell (2007) for a thorough discussion.
7See for instance Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), Crampes, Haritchabalet and Jullien (2009),
and Armstrong (2006).
8E.g., Keen and Delipalla (1992), Dierickx, Matutes and Neven (1998) and Anderson et al
(2001a, 2001b). For a survey, see Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).
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truth to be told, the true story will be revealed to individuals with access to all
providers of news. Using a very di¤erent model Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005)
show that individuals who combine news from di¤erent sources can form accurate
beliefs about an event even though the stories told may be biased. In an empirical
paper Gentzkow, Glaeser, and Goldin (2006) study the Crédit Mobilier scandal
of 1878, where bribes were paid to US Republican congressmen in exchange for
favorable votes. They show that Republican newspapers in the end reported just as
many facts as Democratic newspapers. One interpretation of their nding is that
over time it became too costly in terms of reputation and credibility for Republican
papers to suppress information. Our relation to this literature is indirect in the
sense that we argue that public policy has a strong inuence on the diversication
strategies of media rms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The formal model is pre-
sented in Section 2, and Section 3 derives the newspapersequilibrium prices, invest-
ments in journalism and prole choices. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ects of changing
the ad-valorem tax rate levied on newspapers and ads, and it compares the optimal
tax rates. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We employ a standard Hotelling model with two competing media rms each selling
a newspaper to readers and ad-inserts to advertisers. The readers are uniformly
distributed along the unit line according to their political view; a consumer who is
located at point 0 is extremely left-wing, whilst a consumer located at 1 is extremely
right-wing. Consumers with more moderate views are located closer to the center of
the unit line. We assume that each reader buys the newspaper which has the prole
which best corresponds to his political view, other things equal.
The political proles of newspapers 1 and 2 are given by the locations x1 and
1 x2; respectively, as illustrated in Figure 1. We follow Tabuchi and Thisse (1995)
in allowing the rms to locate both inside and outside the Hotelling line (this means
that we might have e.g. x1 < 0): Throughout, we assume that newspaper 2 is located
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(weakly) to the right of newspaper 1; (1  x2)  x1: Note that an increase in x1
and/or x2 means that the newspapers become less horizontally di¤erentiated, and
vice versa. The further away a newspaper prole is from the ideal positionof a
specic reader, the smaller is his utility from reading it. We model this utility loss
by a distance cost parameter, t > 0.
0 1
x1 x2
Figure 1: Location of the newspapers.
In addition to choosing its prole, each newspaper can also make investments in
journalism in order to become more attractive to readers. Letting pi  0 denote the
price and ji  0 the journalistic quality level of newspaper i = 1; 2; the utility level
of a consumer located at point x who buys newspaper i is given by
Ui = v + ji   pi   t(di   x)2; (1)
where d1 = x1; d2 = 1   x2; and v is a positive constant: The squaring of the last
term in (1) means that distance costs increase quadratically with the distance from
the most preferred location.9
Consumers have unit demand, and we assume that the parameter v is su¢ ciently
large to ensure complete market coverage. This means that each consumer buys
either newspaper 1 or newspaper 2. Let ~x denote the location of the consumer who
is indi¤erent between buying newspaper 1 and newspaper 2; v+j1 p1 t(x1 ~x)2 =
v+ j2  p2  t(1 x2  ~x)2: Consumers located to the left of ~x (x < ~x) consequently
prefer newspaper 1, while consumers to the right of ~x (x > ~x) prefer newspaper 2.
From this we nd that demand Di for newspaper i equals
Di = xi +
1  x1   x2
2
+
p i   pi
2t(1  x1   x2) +
ji   j i
2t(1  x1   x2) ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (2)
9It is worth pointing out that the linear way in which quality enters the utility function achieves
simplicity without compromising the qualitative direction of our results.
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Advertisers may buy inserts in either or both newspapers, and newspaper is net
advertising revenue is given by Ai: The willingness to pay for advertising depends
on the number of readers and the advertising volume. We follow Peitz and Valletti
(2008) and Anderson and Coate (2005) in assuming that newspaper i faces a simple
downward-sloping demand curve for advertising per reader. More specically, letting
ri be the price of advertising per reader and ai the advertising volume, we have
ri =   ai (;  > 0): (3)
With Di readers, we consequently nd that net advertising revenue equals
Ai =

  ai
1 + T
  cA

aiDi; (4)
where cA  0 is the marginal cost of adverts, and T  0 is the ad-valorem tax on
advertising. A higher  or a smaller  can be interpreted as though the size of the
ad market has increased:10
The prot level of newspaper i is given by
i =

pi
1 + 
  cN

Di + Ai  K(ji); (5)
where   0 is the ad-valorem tax rate on newspaper sales and cN  0 is the marginal
cost of printing and distributing the newspaper. The last term in (5) represents the
costs of investing in journalism, with K 0(ji) > 0 and K 00(ji) > 0: In order to obtain
closed-form solutions, we shall in the following let K(ji) = j2i =2: The constant
 > 0 is assumed to be su¢ ciently large to ensure that all second-order conditions
for prot maximization are fullled.
3 Equilibrium
The timing of the game turns out to be important when analyzing the e¤ects of tax
policy in Hotelling models. Regularly, it is assumed that newspapers set advertising
levels and newspaper prices simultaneously at the nal stage of the game. Such a
10An increase in  means that the willingness to pay for advertising becomes higher, while a
reduction in  is equivalent to an increase in the number of advertisers.
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timing is useful to highlight the fact that an increase in the size of the advertising
market may lead media rms to reduce newspaper prices; by doing so they will
attract a larger number of readers and thus increase revenue from the advertising
market. However, due to the peculiarities of the Hotelling model, the media rms
would pass on 100 % of any additional revenue from the advertising market to the
consumers in the form of lower newspaper prices if advertising levels and newspa-
per prices were set simultaneously. This has the implication that the newspapers
would actually be completely indi¤erent to the size of the advertising market and
to whether advertising revenue is taxed (see Appendix for a proof).
In our view, these predictions do not ring true. Media rms seem to care about
the size of advertising markets, and they are not indi¤erent to whether advertising
revenue is taxed. To capture this, below we model a sequential game with three
stages, where at stage 1 each newspaper decides on its prole and investments in
journalism. Then at stage 2 they choose advertising levels, while newspaper prices
are determined at stage 3. Since newspaper prices, and thus also the number of
copies sold, are the outcome of the nal stage, the sequencing of the game implies
that the media rms cannot commit to a certain number of readers or write contracts
with advertisers which depend on the number of readers. We believe that this
ts well with the actual working of the newspaper market, where advertisers buy
advertising space based on some anticipation of how many readers they will reach. In
the formal model we assume that the advertisers correctly anticipate the number of
readers in equilibrium. In practice a proxy for such anticipations is the use of daily,
weekly, monthly and yearly circulation numbers that newspapers in most countries
make available to advertisers.
Stage 3. Solving the game backwards, at stage 3 each newspaper takes proles,
investments in journalism and advertising levels as given when it decides on the
newspaper price. Using (2) and (5) to solve @i=@pi = 0 we nd
pi = cN(1 + ) +
t (1  xi   x i) (3 + xi   x i)
3
+
ji   j i
3
; i = 1; 2: (6)
Equation (6) shows that the price of newspaper i depends positively on how
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horizontally di¤erentiated it is from its rival and on its journalistic quality level
(@pi=@xi < 0 and @pi=@ji > 0). We also see that the consumer price, other things
equal, is increasing in newspaper taxes; @pi=@ > 0. Apparently, this lends support
to a public policy of imposing low ad-valorem taxes on newspapers in order to reduce
their price.
Stage 2. At the second stage each platform sells advertising space. Substituting
equations (4) and (6) into (5) and solving @i=@ai = 0; we nd that the prot-
maximizing advertising volume equals
ai =
  cA (1 + T )
2
: (7)
From (7) we see that the level of advertising (ai) is decreasing in the ad-valorem
tax T; but increasing in the size of the advertising market, that is, increasing with
 and decreasing with . Making use of equation (7) in (4), we can rewrite total
advertising prot for each platform as
Ai =
[  cA (1 + T )]2
4 (1 + T ) 
Di: (8)
Using equations (5) and (8) we can now derive revenue per reader Ri for each
platform as
Ri =

pi
1 + 
  cN

+
[  cA (1 + T )]2
4 (1 + T ) 
;
where it is useful to note that revenue per reader falls following a rise in either of
the two ad-valorem tax rates.11
Stage 1. At the rst stage the two media platforms determine their proles and
investments in journalism. The rst-order conditions are found by solving @i =@xi =
@i =@ji = 0 (i = 1; 2), where 

i denotes prots given optimal prices and ad levels.
Starting with each newspapers choice of prole (horizontal dimension), we note
that
11It is easily veried that @Ri (; T ) =@ < 0 and @Ri (; T ) =@T < 0.
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di
dxi
=

pi
1 + 
  cN
2664
direct e¤ectz}|{
@Di
@xi
+
strategic e¤ectz }| {
@Di
@p i
dp i
dxi
3775
| {z }
(I) Reader market (-)
+
@Ai
@Di
dDi
dxi| {z }
(II) Ad market (+)
: (9)
Terms (I) and (II) in equation (9) measure the marginal prot for newspaper i
in the reader and ad market, respectively, of choosing a prole which is closer to
that of the rival. Following the convention in the Hotelling literature, the two terms
in the square bracket of equation (9) are labeled the direct and the strategic e¤ect,
respectively. The direct e¤ect is positive, other things equal, and captures the fact
that the newspaper increases its market share by moving closer to its rival. However,
the price charged by the rival is lower the smaller the distance between the rms
(dp i=dxi < 0), so the strategic e¤ect is negative.
It is well known from the Principle ofMaximum Di¤erentiation that the strategic
e¤ect dominates over the demand e¤ect (e.g. Tirole, 1988). Thus, expression (I)
in equation (9) is negative. Expression (II), on the other hand, is positive (see
Appendix for a proof). The reason is that the newspaper acquires a larger readership
and consequently earns higher prot in the ad market if it moves closer to its rival. A
large ad market may therefore give rise to the Principle ofMinimum Di¤erentiation,
as discussed by Gabszewicz et al (2001, 2002).
Di¤erentiating prot with respect to investments in journalism (the vertical di-
mension) we nd
di
dji
=

pi
1 + 
  cN
2664
direct e¤ectz}|{
@Di
@ji
+
strategic e¤ectz }| {
@Di
@p i
dp i
dji
3775
| {z }
(I): Reader market (+)
+
@Ai
@Di
dDi
dji| {z }
(II): Ad market (+)
  ji: (10)
The square bracket in (10) shows that there is a direct and a strategic e¤ect also
for journalistic investments; demand for newspaper i increases if it invests more in
journalism, but the rival will respond by reducing its newspaper price. The latter
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reduces the positive e¤ect of journalistic improvements, but the former e¤ect unam-
biguously dominates. Therefore Expression (I) in (10) is positive (see Appendix).
It is straightforward to show that also Expression (II) is positive. The reason
is that a higher investment level increases the size of the readership and thus the
revenue from ad-inserts: formally, we have
@Ai
@Di
=

  ai
1 + T
  cA

ai > 0
and
dDi
dji
=
1
6t (1  x1   x2) > 0: (11)
Equation (11) contains the important message that dDi=dji is increasing in x1 and x2:
This means that the demand-expanding e¤ect of a given improvement in journalism
is larger if the newspapers are good substitutes than if they are poor substitutes.
The intuitive explanation is that the better substitutes the newspapers are, the more
prone the consumers are to shift from a newspaper with low journalistic quality to
one with high journalistic quality. As we shall see later, this gives rise to a business-
stealing e¤ect which implies that each newspaper has greater incentives to make
investments in journalism in order to capture readers from its rival the closer the
newspapers are located on the Hotelling line.
In order to characterize the prot-maximizing prole and investment level we set
(9) and (10) equal to zero. The rst-order conditions for a symmetric equilibrium
are then given by
xi =  
1
4
+
[  cA (1 + T )]2 (1 + )
16 (1 + T ) t
; (12)
and
ji =
4t (1 + T )
12t (1 + T )  [  cA (1 + T )]2 (1 + )
	
(1 + )
: (13)
The second term on the right-hand side of equation (12) is equal to zero if the
rm does not make any advertising revenue: In this case xi =  14 ; in order to soften
competition the rms will thus locate outside the Hotelling line (at x1 =  1=4
and 1   x2 = 5=4). This is a standard result in Hotelling models with quadratic
transportation costs; see Tabuchi and Thisse (1995), Lambertini (1994, 1997) and
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Brekke and Straume (2004). However, it is readily veried from equation (12) that
xi is increasing in the size of the advertising market, but that x

i < 1=2 (so that
the newspapers are not perfect substitutes) whenever the second-order condition for
quality investment is satised (see Appendix).
From equation (13) it can be veried that ji is increasing in the size of the
advertising market. To see why, note rst that the advertisers do not care about
the journalistic quality of the newspaper per se; their only concern is the number
of readers. The size of the ad market therefore has no direct e¤ect on the media
rms investment incentives. However, the newspapers will be less di¤erentiated
the larger the advertising market, and we know from equation (11) that less hori-
zontal di¤erentiation makes the business stealing motive for investing in journalism
stronger.
Summing up, we have:
Proposition 1 The newspapers will be less di¤erentiated but will undertake larger
investments in journalism the greater the size of the advertising market (dxi =d >
0; dxi =d < 0 and dj

i =d > 0; dj

i =d < 0).
The equilibrium values in the consumer and advertising markets are now found
by inserting (12) and (13) into (2), (6) and (8):
pi =
3
2
t+ cN (1 + )  [  cA (1 + T )]
2 (1 + )
8 (1 + T )
; (14)
Ai =
[  cA (1 + T )]2
8 (1 + T )
: (15)
By inspecting equation (14) we may state:
Corollary 2 The newspaper price is decreasing in the size of the advertising market.
Corollary 2 reects the fact that in order to attract a large number of readers
and increase advertising revenue, each media rm accepts a lower newspaper price
the bigger is the advertising market.
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4 E¤ects of taxing media products
This section analyzes how higher ad-valorem taxes a¤ect the newspapersstrategic
choices. For this purpose, we treat locations, investments in journalism and newspa-
per prices as functions of the two exogenous tax rates, i.e., xi (); j

i (); p

i () where
 2 f; Tg. Let us rst consider the newspaperschoice of location. From equation
(12) we nd that
dxi
d
=
[  cA (1 + T )]2
16t (1 + T )
> 0: (16)
Equation (16) reects the fact that higher ad-valorem taxes on newspapers make
the advertising market relatively more important for the media rms. Thereby it
becomes more valuable to aim for the mass market, inducing each newspaper to
locate closer to its competitor. This relocation e¤ect is clearly stronger the larger
the advertising market (i.e., higher ; smaller ).
To see what happens to the newspaper price if the ad valorem tax on the news-
paper () goes up, we di¤erentiate equation (14) and obtain
dpi
d
= cN   [  cA (1 + T )]
2
8 (1 + T )
: (17)
As in a one-sided market, the direct e¤ect of a higher  is to increase the newspaper
price if marginal costs are positive. This is captured by the rst term on the right-
hand side of (17). However, newspapers endogenously become less horizontally
di¤erentiated when  increases, so there will be tougher price competition between
the newspapers. This relocation e¤ect in turn tends to reduce the newspaper price,
as shown by the second term on the right-hand side of (17).
The net result depends on the relative strength of these two e¤ects and cannot
be signed in general, but equation (17) shows that the relocation e¤ect is more
likely to dominate and lead to a price reduction the larger the advertising market.
Specically, it can be shown that dpi =d < 0 if  > 1  2
p
2 (1 + T )cN +
(1 + T ) cA. This condition always holds if marginal costs are equal to zero (cA =
cN = 0).
The consequences of a higher  for investments in journalism are also ambiguous.
On the one hand, the prot margin of the newspapers falls subsequent to a tax
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increase, other things equal. This has a negative e¤ect on the incentives to invest
in journalism. On the other hand, we have seen that the newspapers will locate
closer to each other if  increases. To clearly see the implications of the latter for
investments in journalism, we di¤erentiate equation (13) and use (16) to nd
dji
d
= 3 (1 + )j2i

8
3
dxi
d
  1
1 + 

: (18)
The larger dxi =d; the less di¤erentiated the newspapers will be, and the stronger
each newspapers incentive to invest in journalism in order to capture readers from
its rival (business-stealing e¤ect). This explains why the change in investments is
proportional to the relocation e¤ect. Since the relocation e¤ect in turn is stronger
the larger the advertising market, we nd that a higher newspaper tax increases
journalistic investments if the ad market is su¢ ciently large; combining equations
(16) and (18) we have dji =d > 0 if  > 2 
q
6(1+T )t
1+
+ (1 + T ) cA.
We can now state:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the ad-valorem tax on newspapers () increases. Then:
(a) the newspapers become less di¤erentiated ( dxi =d > 0),
(b) the newspaper price falls if  > 1 ( dpi =d < 0); and
(c) investments in journalism increase if  > 2 ( dji =d > 0).
Figure 2 provides a numerical illustration of Proposition 3. The size of the
advertising market is captured by  on the horizontal axis, and with the chosen
parameter values (see Appendix), we nd that dpi =d < 0 if  >
4
5
p
5  1:79: The
upward-sloping curve shows that dji =d > 0 if  >
p
3  1:73:12 For  > 4
5
p
5 a
higher ad-valorem tax will thus reduce the newspaper price and increase investments
in journalism.
12As shown by equation (16), xi is monotonically increasing in : For the parameter values used
in Figure 2, we have xi =  1=4 + 2=8: This means that xi = 0:111 at  = 1:7 and xi = 0:155 at
 = 1:8:
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Figure 2: Value added taxes on newspapers: price and investment responses.
Let us now consider the e¤ects of increasing T . Higher ad-valorem taxes on ads
make the advertising market relatively less protable for the newspapers, and will
therefore lead to increased di¤erentiation:
dxi
dT
=  

2   c2A (1 + T )2

(1 + )
16t (1 + T )2
< 0:
How does the newspaper price depend on the tax level on ads? We have already
seen that pi is independent of T at the nal stage of the game; c.f. equation (6).
The newspaper price is nevertheless increasing in advertising taxes. This is due
to the relocation e¤ect: since the newspapers end up being more di¤erentiated if T
increases, the competitive pressure falls. This unambiguously allows the newspapers
to increase their prices. Additionally, the lower competitive pressure reduces the
newspapersincentive to invest in journalism. We therefore have
dpi
dT
=
(1 + ) [  cA(1 + T )] [2cA + (1 + T )]
1 + T
> 0;
dji
dT
=   4t

[  cA(1 + T )]2 + 2cA(1 + T )2
	


12t(1 + T )  [  cA(1 + T )]2 (1 + )
	 < 0: (19)
The e¤ects of taxing advertising can be summarized as follows:
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Proposition 4 Suppose that the ad valorem tax on ads (T ) increases. Then
(a) the newspapers become more di¤erentiated ( dxi =dT < 0),
(b) the newspaper price increases ( dpi =dT > 0), and
(c) investments in journalism fall ( dji =dT < 0).
Comparing Propositions 2 and 3 we see that the two taxes have very di¤erent
e¤ects. A reduction in the ad-valorem tax on newspapers (the reduced-rate regime
in many countries) makes each platform di¤erentiate its prole further. In contrast,
a fall in the tax on ads has the opposite e¤ect; it leads to less di¤erentiation. The
impact on journalistic investments and newspaper prices may also be of opposite
signs, but whether this is the case depends on the importance of advertising as a
source of revenue.
Having discussed the newspapersequilibrium quality levels and proles, and the
e¤ects of taxation, we shall now scrutinize the rst-best outcome. As in standard
Hotelling models, the socially optimal location of the newspapers is given by xi =
xopt  1=4 (since this minimizes aggregate transportation costs). To nd the optimal
quality levels, we note from equation (1) that reader utility increases by @Ui=@ji = 1
units if the quality level of newspaper i increases by one unit. The marginal social
benet of a higher journalistic quality of newspaper i is thus equal to Di@Ui=@ji =
1=2: Since the marginal costs of investing in journalism equal K 0(ji) = ji; we
consequently have ji = jopt  1=(2) in optimum.
To see how the market equilibrium compares to this, it is useful to express
the rst-order conditions for location and investment in journalism as a function of
advertising revenue net of taxes. Recalling from equation (15) that Ai =
[ cA(1+T )]2
8(1+T )
,
and skipping subscripts, we can use equations (9) and (10) to write
x =  1
4
+
A (1 + )
2t
(20)
and
j =
4t
[12t  8A (1 + )] (1 + ): (21)
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From a social point of view the size of the advertising market is irrelevant both for
the optimal location of the newspapers and for investments in journalism. In market
equilibrium, on the other hand, we know from Proposition 1 that the newspapers will
locate closer to each other and invest more in journalism the larger the advertising
market; dx=dA > 0 and dj=dA > 0. Not surprisingly, we therefore nd x > xopt and
j > jopt if the advertising market is su¢ ciently large.
Let us rst nd what the size of the advertising market must be for the newspa-
pers to choose the socially optimal locations. Setting x = xopt and solving equation
(20) with respect to A; yields that the newspapers have the socially optimal locations
if
A = Ax()  t
1 + 
: (22)
The function Ax() is shown by the solid curve in Figure 3.13 Below this curve
the advertising market is so small that the newspapers are excessively di¤erentiated
(x < xopt), while the opposite is true above the curve.
Setting j = jopt we likewise nd that the newspapers have the socially optimal
quality levels if
A = Aj()  t
1 + 
  1  
2 (1 + )2
t: (23)
The dashed curve in Figure 3 illustrates Aj(): Below this curve the ad market is
so small that the newspapers invest too little in journalism, while investments are
excessively high above the curve.
13We have set t = 1 in this gure:
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Figure 3: Advertising market and newspaper taxes.
In absence of taxes, the newspapers will be insu¢ ciently di¤erentiated if the
advertising market is "large". In this case one might expect that the government
should optimally set  < 0. However, this need not be the case. Actually, with our
model specications, a negative VAT on newspaper sales will never be optimal. To
see the intuition for this, we may note the following
Lemma 1: Suppose A = Ax(); such that x = xopt:: In this case j = 12
 
2
+1

:
Recalling that jopt = 1=(2); Lemma 1 says that if the newspapers are optimally
located (x = xopt:), then they will invest too much in journalism if  < 1 and too
little if  > 1: Only at  = 1 will the newspapers have the correct investment incen-
tives. The exact value of  is of course model specic, but the fact that a positive
newspaper tax might be optimal reects a general point: for any given output, a
prot maximizing rm tends to overinvest in quality improvements compared to
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the social optimum if it faces strong competition from a close substitute (while the
opposite is true if competition is weak, see e.g. Tirole, 1988). Intuitively, the reason
for this is that if consumers perceive two products as to be very similar, rms have
strong incentives to invest in quality in order to steal customers from each other.
To lower the investment incentives, the government might thus impose a tax which
reduces the marginal prot of investing.14
A necessary condition for the newspapers to make correct investments is thus
that  = 1: We further have:
Proposition 5: By setting  = 1 and T =
h
2t + (  cA) cA   2
p
t (cA + t)
i
=c2A
(with T = 
2
4t
  1 if cA = 0) the government induces the newspapers to choose the
socially optimal proles and investment levels. The optimal tax on advertisements
increases with market size.
Proof: See Appendix.
Not surprisingly, we can derive from Proposition 5 that the tax rate on ads should
be negative if the ad market is su¢ ciently small, and that the optimal value of T is
increasing in the size of the advertising market.
5 Concluding remarks
Newspapers are based on a two-sided business model where the newspaper creates
content that is used to attract readers. The larger the number of readers a newspaper
gets on board, the more attractive it is for advertisers. We have demonstrated that
this two-sidedness has a profound e¤ect on how tax policy a¤ects the strategic
variables of the newspapers. A main nding that emerges from our analysis is
that a fall in the ad valorem tax rate on newspapers implies that they become more
di¤erentiated. The reason is that a lower newspaper tax makes it more attractive for
the media rms to derive income from newspaper sales relative to selling advertising
14The British tabloidswillingness to pay for paparazzi pictures is an indication that newspapers
might have too strong incentives to invest in "journalism" to attract readers.
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space. By choosing a di¤erent prole from its competitor, the rm gains market
power and thus earns more revenue from newspaper sales.
Many countries that levy low indirect taxes on newspapers are currently consid-
ering whether this policy should be continued. However, the debate typically does
not explicitly take into account the fact that newspapers operate in two-sided mar-
kets, and that tax policies might work very di¤erently in such markets compared to
more traditional markets. Our analysis indicates that there is a strong relationship
between the size of the advertising market and the optimal taxation of newspaper
sales. If the ad market is large, newspapers tend to be insu¢ ciently di¤erentiated
and are likely to make socially excessive investments in order to attract readers. The
British tabloidswillingness to pay for paparazzi pictures, for example, may be seen
as an indication that newspapers have too strong incentives to cater for the masses.
If this is the case, and politicians expect the advertising market to remain strong
(after correcting for business cycle e¤ects), it might be unwise to increase taxes on
newspapers. If the advertising market becomes signicantly smaller, on the other
hand, politicians might consider increasing the tax rate on newspapers to avoid ex-
cessive di¤erentiation. Lobbyists from the newspaper industry regularly argue that
a smaller advertising market calls for low tax rates on newspaper sales in order to
avoid unnecessary nancial distress for the newspaper industry. Our analysis does
not support such a view. First, such a view neglects the importance of balancing
revenues from the two sides of the market. Second, it would be highly ine¢ cient
to support newspapers in nancial distress by giving tax exemption to the whole
industry.
Finally, we would also like to stress that media policies need several instruments
to achieve several objectives. The present paper illustrates that it might be optimal
to tax both newspaper sales and advertising in order to correct for market failures
concerning di¤erentiation and investments. However, note that we have not taken
into account the possibility that readers may regard ads as a bad (or as a good, for
that matter). Neither have we discussed whether newspaper advertising is informa-
tive or persuasive. Including such factors in the analysis would clearly a¤ect the
optimal tax rates, but would be beyond the scope of the present paper. Instead,
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we have pointed out that policy debates which disregard the fact that most printed
newspapers operate in two-sided markets might be misleading. More generally, our
claim is that the development of theories for two-sided markets underscores the
need for more research on media economics, both theoretical and empirical. Also,
as competition from the internet, mobile phones and other technologies intensies,
the challenges for media policies are likely to become even more complex.
6 Appendix
Simultaneous pricing and advertising
Suppose that media rms set newspaper prices and ad levels simultaneously. The
rst-order condition for advertising does not change and is still given by (8). Solving
@i=@pi = 0 we further nd that
pi =

cN   Ai
Di

(1 + ) +
t (1  xi   x i) (3 + xi   x i)
3
+
ji   j i
3
; i = 1; 2: (24)
This shows that an increase in Ai=Di, the equilibrium advertising revenue after
taxes per reader, is equivalent to a reduction in newspaper production cost, and
will therefore reduce newspaper prices one-for-one. It is well known that the size
of the marginal production costs has no e¤ect on rm protability in standard
symmetric Hotelling models. The di¤erence between (6) and this price is equal to
Ai= [Di(1 + )]. Accordingly, by inserting for (24) into (5), we nd that newspaper
prots do not depend on the size of the advertising market:
i = Di
ji   j i + t (1  xi   x i) (3 + xi   x i)
1 + t
: Q:E:D:
Proof that @Ai
@Di
dDi
dxi
> 0 (equation (9))
Di¤erentiating equation (8) with respect to Di we nd that
@Ai
@Di
=

  ai
1 + T
  cA

ai: (25)
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Inserting (6) into (2) it further follows that
dDi
dxi
=
1
6
t (1  x1   x2)2   ji + j i
t (1  x1   x2)2
:
In a symmetric equilibrium (xi = x i and ji = j i) we consequently have
@Ai
@Di
dDi
dxi

sym
=

  ai
1 + T
  cA

ai
6
> 0:
Proof that @

i
@ji
> 0 (equation (10))
Di¤erentiating i with respect to ji and using the envelope theorem (which implies
that @i
@pi
@pi
@ji
= 0) we have
@i
@ji
=

p1
1 + 
  cN

@Di
@ji
+
@Di
@p i
dp i
dji

+
@Ai
@Di
dDi
dji
  ji: (26)
We further nd 
@Di
@ji
+
@Di
@p i
dp i
dji

sym
=
1
3t (1  2xi) > 0
and
@Ai
@Di
dDi
dji

sym
=

  a1
1 + T
  cA

ai
2t (1  2xi) > 0:
The two rst terms on the right-hand side of (10) are thus positive. Q.E.D.
Second-order conditions
The second-order conditions for the third and the second stage are straightforwardly
calculated. However, the second-order conditions for the rst stage are more complex
(and will obviously not be satised if  is too small), and require that
@2i
@j2i
=  9t (1 + ) (1  x1   x2)  1
9 (1 + ) t (1  x1   x2) < 0; (27)
0 >
@2i
@x2i
=  
(
t2 (5 + 3xi   x i) (1  x1   x2)3 (1 + T )
9t (1 + ) (1  x1   x2)3 (1 + T )
(28)
 (ji   j i)
 
4 (1 + T ) (ji   j i)  3 (  cA (1 + T ))2 (1 + )

36t (1 + ) (1  x1   x2)3 (1 + T )
)
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and 
@2i
@j2i

@2i
@x2i

 

@2i
@ji@xi
2
> 0 (29)
where
@2i
@ji@xi
2
=
 
8 (1 + T )
 
(ji   j i) + t (1  x1   x2)2

+ 3 (A  cN (1 + T ))2 (1 + )
2
5184 (1 + )2 t2 (1  x1   x2)4 (1 + T )2 2
:
(30)
A necessary condition for the second-order conditions to be satised is that  >
[9t (1 + ) (1  x1   x2)] 1 : Otherwise, the costs of investing in journalism are so
low that @2i=@j2i is non-negative. Note that a necessary condition for @
2i=@j
2
i to
be negative, is that (1  x1   x2) > 0; which in a symmetric equilibrium amounts
to xi < 1=2:
Parameter values Parameter values in Figure 2 and Figure 4: cN = 0; t =
1=2;  = 2; cA = 2=5 and  = 1: In Figure 2 T =  = 0; while  = 1 in Figure 4.
Using equations (27) - (30) it can be veried that all second-order conditions are
satised within the range of  shown in the gures.
Proof of Proposition 5
Solving A = [ cA(1+T )]
2
8(1+T )
= Ax = Aj with  = 1 yields the optimal value of T .
Setting Ax() = Aj() we immediately nd  = 1 (see also Figure 3). Solving
A = [ cA(1+T )]
2
8(1+T )
= Ax = t=2 we arrive at
T =
2t + (  cA) cA   2
p
t (cA + t)
c2A
with T = 
2
4t
  1 if cA = 0: Di¤erentiation yields
@T
@
=
1
cA
 
1  tp
t22 + tcA
!
> 0;
@T
@
=   t
cA
 
cA+ 2tp
t(cA+ t)
  2
!
< 0
because cA+2t > 2
p
t(cA+ t) is equivalent to (cA+2t)2 4(t(cA+t)) =
(cA)
2 > 0, so that T unambiguously increases with the size of the ad market.
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